spreads between asset yields and embedded policy interest rates was adequate for those times. Most insurers are very conservative by disposition and tend to wait until they are obliged to implement a new financial approach, whether the outside pressure comes from regulators, standards boards, or competition. Moreover, some of the early ones to implement the tools of Macaulay and Hicks did not fare so well. As we later learned, certain key assumptions in the duration formulas were not only violated in the real world, but these violations of assumptions could be fatal (Vanderhoof [1972] ). For example, interest-sensitive cash flows, credit risk, and non-parallel shifts in the term structure violated the assumptions of the models, compromising the efficacy of the estimated durations based on them.
While this would be expected to produce estimates of duration for asset portfolios that were roughly 20 percent too high, owing to call features and prepayment speeds, on the liability side of the bala nce sheet, the computed durations could overshoot the mark by 200-500 percent (Babbel [1995 (Babbel [ , 1999b ). An attempt to match asset portfolio duration to the duration of the liabilities could set an insurer up to fail if a rise in interest rates were to occur, because assets would be far too long in duration relative to the true, effective duration of the insurance liabilities.
This sort of error continued into the early 1990s.
Not all were quick to ignore the underlying assumptions of the duration formulae. For example, Irwin Vanderhoof and James Tilley, who were both working for The Equitable during the late 70's and early 80's, were busy trying to refine and implement in an insurance context the tools of A/L M. Their efforts were almost timely, as the largest spike of interest rates in the U.S. history punctuated their research. I said "almost timely" for a reason; what readily became apparent is that the extant tools for A/L M were inadequate for implementation by insurers due to the various option-like features on both sides of their balance sheets, in part, and due to a lack of understanding of the true problem and the urgency of A/L M by higher management. By the time the financial community figured out how to calculate measures of effective duration that took fully into account the convexity occasioned by these options, the crisis had passed… at least for a while. The actuarial approach at that time was incapable of addressing economic value, and was focused primarily on statutory accounting issues and regulatory compliance. These programs added a cash flow testing module that was equally flawed. The programs would generate numerous scenarios of cash flows as they might evolve over time, both for assets and for liabilities. On the asset side of the balance sheet, they would begin with promised cash flows from bonds, mortgages, and the like, adjust for historical default rates, and project these cash flows by linking them to interest rate scenarios of dubious validity. On the liability side of the balance sheet, they would project insurance policy cash inflows and outflows under various assumptions, again linking them to these interest rate scenarios. Because there was seldom sufficient data available from the insurers that could track lapse 3 sensitivity to changing interest rates, assumptions about the form of the lapse function were substituted. Then liability expected cash flows would be subtracted from asset expected cash flows, resulting in a stream of net expected cash flows, which could be discounted at a cost of capital to arrive at what was purported to be economic value.
The flaw was that in practice, one expected cash flow was merely sub tracted from another expected cash flow to arrive at a net expected cash flow.
There was inadequate adjustment for full financial risk before performing the subtraction operation, making many lines of business appear to be value producing, when in actuality they were not.
Let us consider a simple example to illustrate the problem insurers often experience in choosing an appropriate discount rate for their risky net cash flows.
Suppose that an insurer has perpetual bonds with promised yields of 10% at a time when prevailing risk-free rates are 10%. Suppose further that these bonds can be obtained at par for $100 million. Next, suppose that an insurer has liabilities worth $100 million that cost 8% into the foreseeable future. Absent any other assets and liabilities, the insurer has a net worth of zero. However, the promised net cash flows from the insurance operation would appear to be 2% of $100 million in perpetuity.
To transform promised yield into expected return, insurers would typically subtract from the promised asset yields an amount to reflect average default experience, such as 1%. This partial adjustment for risk would leave an expected perpetual stream of bond revenue of 9% against an 8% certain cost, or $1 million per year in perpetuity. Applying any discount rate to such an expected stream of income will result in a positive number for net worth when the net worth is zero.
What should have been done is first to fully adjust the cash flow streams separately to a common, risk-adjusted basis before netting them and then to discount them. insufficiently calibrated with the scenarios generated; 2) scenarios generated with little attention given to the underlying economic dynamics; and 3) primitive economic scenario generators with misspecified correlations and an inadequate sampling to achieve any statistical significance.
For two reasons, the vendors of such products are able to achieve substantial sales volume to their insurance clients. Either the client is less sophisticated, or else no better alternatives exist. For these reasons, sales volume is a poor metric of adequacy in this area. A number of insurers have been sufficiently frustrated that they have created their own software in a manner that Some of the most recent products on the market for insurers inspire little confidence. For example, one popular program computes the optimal asset portfolio for a given set of liabilities based exclusively on promised yield. In effect, the purchaser has paid to find out what the highest yielding (and most likely the very lowest market-perceived quality) bond is in any given category. I am sorry to say that this is not the only A/L M model where the model engineering is far better than the economic content.
Some of the recent products rely on bare bones valuation models that have too few risk factors to capture the real business of insurance -where profit is typically accompanied by basis risk. The one-factor models assume perfect correlation of interest rate movements along the entire yield curve, and accommodate no basis risk at all. In order to obtain solutions, they often rely on assumed stochastic processes that do not reflect how actual markets behave. Rather than belabor the current state of practice in the insurance industry, discussed at length elsewhere (Babbel and Santomero [1999] ), the remainder of this paper is devoted to what needs to be done and what will be done in the future.
Much of what was projected in "Asset/Liability Management for Insurers" (Babbel and Stricker [1987] ) and "Gazing into the Insurance Future" (Babbel [1988] ) has already come to fruition, but not all. In those papers the assumption that the focus of A/L M was on value was premature. It is curious that the pioneers of the science had focused on value, but somewhere along the line, insurers took a turn away from value and toward the accounting books. The time has come for insurers to refocus the A/L M effort onto economic value.
Gazing Into the Insurance Future, Part II
While the past and present practices of insurance A/L M have focused primarily on yield spreads, earnings, and on cash flow, the new focus will be centered on value, and the influence of economic and non economic factors on fluctuations in value. This movement is well under way and cannot be stopped, although it will hit a few speed bumps along the way. There is a confluence of forces that is impelling the movement forward along this path.
The Financial Economics Paradigm
One force contributing to this direction is that the financial economics paradigm is becoming more widely accepted. 7 In finance, the goal has always been to produce more firm value, and there are sound economic reasons that undergird the pursuit of this goal. Over the past two decades, actuarial training has substantially increased the amount of exposure to financial economics that is necessary to become certified as a Fellow. As more actuaries become steeped in market value economics, they become more favorably disposed to focusing on economic value. These actuaries are gradually moving up the corporate ladders and are becoming decision drivers in insurance firms.
Page 15
Regulatory and Standards Bodies
Another force that is impelling us toward a greater focus on economic value is the direction of several professional and regulatory bodies. Among those pushing toward a greater emphasis on value are the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the International Accounting Standards, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the American Academy of Actuaries, and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. Each has studied the issue and come out on the side of market value or fair value. While a lot remains to be done before their ideas can be fully implemented, a huge amount of manpower has already been devoted to these issues.
Performance Evaluation Focus
A third force that is moving insurers toward a value focus is that performance evaluation techniques are improving. It is patent that how we measure things tends to influence our priorities. In the past, insurance performance was most often based on earnings. Kim Staking showed in his doctoral dissertation that insurer share prices were only loosely correlated with earnings -indeed, during the 1980s, the correlation was negative 10% for the industry at large (Staking and Babbel [1995] ). It seemed as if the marketplace was looking beyond earnings, and the question arose as to why the industry was still fixated on them. Beginning with the performance measurement system put forth by Goldman Sachs in 1989 (see Vanderhoof [1989, 1999] ), there slowly began to be a change in how insurers would evaluate themselves, where contributions to increased insurer value became the objective.
This has been slowed mainly by a lack of appropriate tools with which to measure these contributions and facilitate performance attribution. However, recently there has been evidence that the tide has turned, as multi-day conferences in New York and elsewhere are held on insurer performance measurement issues, all in a value-centered framework. It appears as if the industry is finally embracing this change.
Demutualization
A fourth development that has underscored the focus on value is the demutualization of the insurance industry. Stock companies have constant reminders that their actions impact perceived economic value, and management incentive options are now being tied in some way to value.
Consolidation
There is much consolidation within the insurance industry due to merger and acquisition activity, as well as the failure of many companies. The remaining players will be more strongly capitalized and better equipped to handle change and sophisticated A/L M initiatives.
Valuation Modeling and Computing Developments
The sixth and seventh developments are also closely related. Recently a number of more advanced and accurate valuation models have been devised and older models have been up graded. Several closed-form solutions to vexing valuation problems have been derived, based on more realistic stochastic processes. This will foster more confidence in the valuation of financial Page 17 instruments for which there are seldom observable market prices. Together with quantum leaps in computer power for those situations requiring intensive numerical valuation procedures, the stage will be set for a much improved economic valuation technology. Both the closed-form valuation approaches and the massive computer power we now have and are currently expanding will vastly improve the speed of our value estimations and foster better stress testing exercises.
Narrowing Spreads
Although there are several other forces that are leading us in the direction of value, I will mention but one more. The profit margins for many insurance products have been narrowing for years, as consumers obtain better information about alternatives available in the insurance and non insurance markets. As spreads narrow, it becomes all the more imperative that managers of an insurer know the pricing limits below which firm value is likely to be reduced at the margin through continued product sales. In the face of narrowing spreads, insurers need more refined techniques to measure value.
With viable tools to assess the economic value of the products they offer, and with more rapid feedback about which products are currently being sold on an unprofitable basis, I expect insurers to discontinue or alter a number of these products. Looking only at yield spreads, earnings or expected cash flow can delay the day of reckoning for a long time; indeed, an unprofitable product can ge nerate positive net cash flows for many years before it is revealed that the product is a loser. With a focus on value, there will be a quicker metric to assess In the insurance marketplace, there is a deep need for a unified valuation model -one that efficiently takes into account the important financial risk factors across all major asset categories and over both sides of the economic balance sheet in a consistent framework Merrill [1998, 1999] ). Only with such a model is it possible to perform credible A/L M. Such a model needs to be based on more realistic stochastic processes than the ones heretofore chosen based mostly on their ability to be solved easily. The model should include both closedform solutions for interest-rate-sensitive financial instruments, and numerical simulation for path-dependent instruments. The closed-form solutions are important in order to get timely calibrations, and the path-dependent estimation is needed for many products offered by insurers. In order to quicken the simulationbased valuations, use of thoughtful low discrepancy points and other variance reduction analytical techniques will displace the use of meat-axe approaches to reducing the number of simulated paths. Now let me close by touching on the suggestions of Fischer Black [1995] in his final published paper and address where we stand today. Black had produced a number of valuation models of his own. He was dissatisfied with them all in some ways, as well competing models. He discussed the inherent limitations of the three basic stochastic processes that have been relied on in most of the valuation models -the normal process, the lognormal process, and the square root process. Models built around a normal process, for instance, allow negative interest rates. The log normal model has interest rate volatility declining too rapidly as interest rates approach zero, and the square root process has interest rates bouncing off their zero rate barrier like a ping pong ball. Black could imagine no credible economic principles that would result in such behavior.
Moreover, the empirical evidence is at odds with them. When interest rates get very low, they do not bounce upward but tend to linger in an absorbing barrieroften for years. This has been observed in the US and recently in Japan.
He suggested for these and other reasons that interest rates be treated as options -where the nominal interest rate would be seen as the sum of the real rate and expected inflation, or zero, whichever was higher. This would allow the valuation models to be founded on fundamental drivers that are of great concern to investors -real rates and inflation. While such models can be solved in simulation form, Black hypothesized that they would not be amenable to an analytical solution, thereby eliminating the possibility of a closed-form solution.
Well the good news is that there is now a closed-form solution available.
It will soon be published, but to make Black's valuation model more accurate, interest-sensitive securities in a total speed of less tha n two seconds. Moreover, the N-factor version of this model can be used to value 26 different classes of financial instruments in a unified framework, and in closed form. These sorts of advances can assist insurers and others to have a viable focus on va lue.
These are exciting developments. And there are more on their way, coming from many different financial economists, both inside and outside academia. I believe that in a day not too distant, modelers will include liquidity risk and capture the changing correlations among security returns that we observe during liquidity crises.
One day, regulators will insist on a value focus, and will require approval of the discount function or interest rate generator. They will require that valuation model assumptions be stated explicitly, and they may even mandate that values be reported for a range of parameters. They may even stipulate how the parameters must be measured for reporting pur poses.
In making these predictions, I am not some wild-eyed academician. I recognize the strong reservations of people like Emanuel Derman [2001] , who is skeptical that any unified valuation model will ever be developed, and that if developed, will ever be useful for estimating economic value because of prevalence of the human element in financial markets. He may be correct. But I do not believe that the valuation efforts should be abandoned due to the observed inadequacies of existing models. Such models produce irrationalities, such as the commonly observed volatility smiles. When we go back to the fundamentalswhen we return to the models' underlying simplifying assumptions and find that the world does not behave as assumed -that is not the time to throw out the notion of valuation models; rather, it is the time to create and solve valuation models that are based on more realistic stochastic processes.
Perhaps some day a valuation process will be developed that involves a complete paradigm shift. Similar things have happened in other scientific fields.
There is even some movement in behavioral finance that would suggest such a paradigm shift is needed. But I am more willing to reject the adequacy of current financial models than I am to reject the economic principles on which they are Page 22 based. The solution to bad models is not to throw out modeling -rather, it is to improve modeling.
The A/L M tools are already well developed 8 ; what have been lacking are useful valuation models, which serve as the crucial input to the A/L M process.
When we have achieved models that can accurately estimate economic values in a consistent way across various asset and liability classes, and across varied scenarios, we will finally be positioned with the crucial ingredients to undertake some serious and more useful A/L M.
As our A/L M models incorporate more of the risk factors important to insurers, they will be useful under a broader range of circumstances. For instance, models that consider only interest rate risk would not have been helpful to insurers facing the economic consequences that followed the September 11 th terrorist bombings in New York City and Washington, D.C. But models that revealed an insurer's exposure to widespread economic deterioration would be helpful, particularly if the economic deterioration were linked to insured events.
Similarly, insurance dependant on the risk pooling mechanism alone would have been of little help to insurers facing severe, widespread economic losses, but insurance based on hedging market and extensive credit weakening could have helped insurers cope with these losses. Finally, VaR techniques, which attempt to model the shape of an insurer's loss distribution and extent of a possible loss, would probably not have presaged such an event and therefore missed its impact.
A/L M techniques, on the other hand, can measure the insurer's economic exposure to such events (but do not pretend to model their probability of occurring) and would be of great help; then an insurer could decide whether to undertake the hedges necessary to limit its exposure to economic loss occasioned by such an event. Clearly, we must do a lot of work before these risk management tools will become more useful. Mistaken value of perpetual business = $1 million ÷ r > $0 for any r such that 0 < r < ∞. True value of perpetual business = $0 million ÷ r = $0 for any r such that − ∞ < r < ∞.
ENDNOTES
1 Smith and Stulz [1985] , Doherty [1985] , and Froot, Scharfstein and Stein [1994] , among others, have contributed to a burgeoning literature. Santomero [1995] provides a synthesis of the literature.
2 PTS was the acronym chosen for his Profit Testing System, an A/L M software program. Today its successor is known as PTS 2000, marketed by SS&C.
3 A lapse of an insurance policy occurs when the policyholder discontinues the payment of periodic premiums required to maintain the policy in force. 4 The interrelationships between these three components of insurer economic value have been discussed at length in Babbel [1999a] and are similar for most financial firms. If there is default risk present in the insurer liabilities, they can still be discounted at the risk-free rate and the default risk can be captured separately in the default put option component. was available inadequate for that purpose. But with some alteration, many of the rest of the firms could have produced estimates of the economic value of liabilities with the software they already had in house. These firms were either unfamiliar with the capabilities of certain software features they had but did not use, or were focused on accounting numbers.
